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The ABA concluded in 1997 that pervasive unfairness in capital punishment
regimes warranted a halt to executions unless all of the systemic problems the
ABA identfied were corrected. Four years later, with those problems still
pervasive, the ABA's Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities issued
protocols designed to facilitate the evaluation of the fairness-or lack thereof-
of a jurisdiction 's capital punishment system. The protocols are particularly
timely because many state legislative bodies are authorizing, or considering
authorizing, studies of death penalty implementation. The protocols provide an
overview, a list of questions to consider, and recommendations with regard to
each topic area they cover. While these are not exhaustive, and are not fully
applicable in every death penalty jurisdiction, they should prove invaluable to
any group seeking to seriously evaluate the manner in which capital punishment
is actually administered today.
I. BACKGROUND: WHY THE ABA ADVOCATES A MORATORIUM
When the American Bar Association (ABA) called in 1997 for a moratorium
on executions, it did so because of systemic unfairness in the administration of
capital punishment. The "last straws" were the elimination of federal funding for
resource centers and the passage of the misleadingly titled Anti-terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).' The ABA was particularly
disturbed by assertions that the AEDPA would merely eliminate frivolous
claims.2 In reality, frivolous claims had been curbed by the courts long before
that . What the AEDPA has done is prevent many people whose constitutional
rights have been prejudicially violated from getting any relief.4
One recent decision purporting to implement the AEDPA illustrates this
situation.5 On January 18, 2001, the Fifth Circuit denied habeas corpus relief to
* Special Counsel, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP. Co-Chair of Death Penalty
Committee, Special Counsel, American Bar Association Section of Individual Rights and
Responsibilities.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-66 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
2 ABA SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, DEATH WITHOUT JUSTICE:
A GUIDE FOR EXAMINING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED
STATES 18 (June 2001), available at www.abanet.org/irr/finalJune28.pdf [hereinafter THE
PROTOCOLS].
I d. at 17-184 1d. at 18.
5 Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Mississippi death row inmate Howard Monteville Neal, even though it
determined that Neal's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel had
been violated and that the Mississippi Supreme Court had been incorrect in
denying Neal relief.6 The Mississippi Supreme Court had concluded that the
ineffectiveness of Neal's trial lawyer in not presenting substantial mitigating
evidence likely did not affect the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.' The
Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that if Neal's counsel had been effective and
had presented the significant available evidence about Neal's life history, there
was a reasonable probability that the jury would have sentenced Neal to life,
rather than death.8 Accordingly, under the applicable Supreme Court standard
regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims,9 Neal should have been
granted relief. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit denied federal habeas corpus relief
to Neal.' 0 It held instead that, under the AEDPA, it was precluded from granting
relief. 11 Under the AEDPA, if the Mississippi Supreme Court reasonably refused
to hold that Strickland's prejudice prong was satisfied, the Fifth Circuit was
precluded from ruling in Neal's favor. 2 Since the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
state court's decision, although incorrect, was not "unreasonable," it denied Neal
relief. 3 Accordingly, he can be executed.
14
The ABA advocates a moratorium on executions until and unless the
systemic unfairness identified in its 1997 resolution is dealt with in accordance
with longstanding ABA policies. 5 That resolution identifies problems with the
following: quality and performance of counsel in all aspects of capital
proceedings; limitations on the courts' ability to adjudicate constitutional claims
on their merits; racial discrimination; the execution of people with mental
retardation; and executions for crimes committed by juveniles. 6 The ABA
continues to bring problems to light through its Death Penalty Moratorium
Implementation Project, which aims to highlight the fundamentally unfair manner
in which the death penalty is being imposed and is working with jurisdictions
throughout the country in addressing concerns.
6 Id. at 694-95, 697.
7 Neal v. Mississippi, 525 So. 2d 1279, 1281-85 (Miss. 1988).
8 Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683,694 (5th Cir. 2001).
9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984).
'0 Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683,697(5th Cir. 2001).
"2 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994)).
'Id. at 694-95.
1d. at 696-97.
141d. at 697.
15 American Bar Association, Death Without Justice: A Guide for Examining the
Administration of the Death Penalty in the United States, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 489, 537 app.A
(2002); Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report Regarding Implementation of the American
Bar Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and
Callingfora Moratorium on Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POvERTY 3, 49 (1996).
Id.
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A moratorium would give a state the opportunity to conduct a thorough,
calmly conducted review of the fairness of its death penalty system. The state
could then consider what to do in light of whatever systemic problems are
identified.
H. WHY THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS & RESPONSIBILITIES SECTION Is Now
ISSUING PROTOCOLS
Four years after the ABA's moratorium resolution put a national spotlight on
systemic fairness issues concerning the death penalty, the ABA Section of
Individual Rights and Responsibilities (Section) has developed protocols that the
Section hopes will be useful to state legislatures and commissions considering the
fairness of the death penalty (preferably during a moratorium). 7 The Section has
prepared these protocols because of our experience in moratorium efforts since
1997. The Section has discovered, as I did in testifying before an Illinois
legislative task force in 1999,8 that many well-intentioned legislators lack basic
information about what to look for in evaluating the fairness of a capital
punishment system and what possible corrective measures could be implemented.
For example, prior to my testimony at the Illinois hearing about procedural
bars to the consideration of meritorious constitutional claims, that subject was
totally "off the radar screen" of the legislative committee. But once the committee
members heard about this issue, they wanted to learn a great deal more about it
and what could be done about it.
The protocols are intended to fill a major gap by providing overviews of
various potential systemic problems, identifying questions that should be asked
with regard to each, and suggesting recommendations for dealing with each.' 9
These are not intended to be exhaustive, however.20 And some of them will not
apply in particular jurisdictions.2'
III. SOME KEY RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE PROTOCOLS
With regard to counsel, there should be qualified, motivated, and properly
compensated counsel at every stage in the proceedings-including trial, direct
appeal, state post-conviction, federal habeas corpus, and clemency.22 If the federal
17 THE PROTOCOLS, supra note 2, at 1-2.
IS The Death Penalty: Hearing of the Illinois House of Representatives Task Force, Aug.
25, 1999 (Belleville, Illinois) (testifying on behalf of the American Bar Association).
19 THE PROTOCOLS, supra note 2, at I passim.
20 Id. at 5 (stating that The Protocols' purpose is rather "to direct attention to areas that
experience has shown contribute to errors in administration of the death penalty").
SId.(explaining that "issues raised in these protocols are not equally problematic in all
capital jurisdictions").22 Id. at 6 (stating that a "primary reason for the American Bar Association's 1997 call for
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government will not provide sufficient funding to enable habeas counsel to
perform effectively then the state government should do so."
A. Appointment and Compensation of Counsel
There should be a statewide appointing authority, not consisting of judges-
as proposed by a blue-ribbon ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force in 1989.
Judges, whether elected or appointed, are frequently subject to pressures to favor
frugality over quality, speed over preparation, and death judgments over fairness.
An independent appointing authority could be immunized from such pressures.
The protocols advocate that counsel be paid periodically during the course of
proceedings.2 4 Lawyers who do not have much in the way of resources are often
expected to pay for experts, investigators, and their own expenses without being
reimbursed for these necessary expenses within a reasonable time frame. This is
not conducive to proper lawyering.
The problems arising from the current manner of appointing counsel have
been highlighted in newspaper stories in several states. 25 According to one
article, "many counties" in the state of Washington "have failed to provide decent
legal representation for poor defendants, even in death-penalty cases," and in
nearly 20% of capital cases since 1981, the "court-appointed lawyers... had
been, or were later, disbarred, suspended or criminally prosecuted., 26 The article
pointed out that Clark County pays a flat fee for capital cases and thereby
encourages defense lawyers to devote little time and effort, since they will get
paid exactly the same irrespective of the amount of time they devote to capital
cases.
27
On August 12, 2001, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer editorialized, based on the
newspaper's special report, that:
Just as the state is charged with the burden of proving the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, it must also help shoulder the financial responsibility
of adequately funding that person's defense. And $12,500, the flat rate paid to
private attorneys on capital cases in places like Clark County, doesn't begin to
a moratorium on executions was the urgent concern that many individuals charged with capital
offenses are not provided with adequate counsel at one or more levels of the capital punishment
process").23Id. at 7 ("Although lawyers and the organized bar can provide valuable assistance
through pro bono services, state governments have primary responsibility---indeed, a
constitutional duty-to ensure adequate representation at every level in capital cases through
appropriate appointment and compensation measures.").
24 THE PROTOCOLS, supra note 2, at 14.
25 For example, see Lise Olsen, Capital Defense on the Cheap, SEATrLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 8, 2001, at Al.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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cut it. Flat fees encourage lawyers to cut comers, argue for guilty pleas and
neglect clients.28
Similarly, in Tennessee, The Tennessean reported on July 25, 2001, that
"[d]ozens of lawyers who have defended clients facing the death penalty in
Tennessee have been in trouble themselves-disciplined by the state for
unethical, unprofessional or illegal activities," and eleven remain eligible for
29appointment in capital cases.
The impact on death row inmates who are appointed such counsel can be
fatal. For example, on August 31, 2001, North Carolina executed Ronald Wayne
Frye.30 Long after Mr. Frye's trial, his trial lawyer "admitted he was drinking
heavily during the case, downing nearly a pint of 80-proof rum every afternoon,"
and that he had been "in a car wreck about the same time and was found with a
near-lethal blood-alcohol level of 0.44/o--at 11 a.m."'31 Due to his counsel's
failure to prepare properly, Mr. Frye was sentenced to death by a jury that knew
almost nothing about Mr. Frye's "nightmarish childhood," during which "his
alcoholic parents gave him away at a diner" at age four.32 He was beaten "with a
bullwhip" by his new father, leaving extreme scars, and he was "shuffled from
family to family, six changes in all."33
B. State Funding of Resource Centers and Post-Conviction and Federal
Habeas Counsel
The protocols recommend state funding of resource centers-and, as noted
above, the funding of proper counsel for all stages of the proceedings, including
state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus.34 State legislators should not
merely shrug their shoulders and say they regret that federal funding for resource
centers has been eliminated. Nor should they hide behind the fact that the
Supreme Court held in Murray v. Giarratano,35 that an indigent death row inmate
does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in state post-conviction
or federal habeas corpus proceedings. 36
2 Editorial, Create Equity for Capital Cases, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 12,
2001, at D6.
29John Shiffman, Troubled Lawyers Still Allowed to Work Death Cases, THE
TENNESSEAN, July 25, 2001, at Al.
30 Jeffrey Geitleman, Execution Ends Debatable Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31,2001, at Al 1.
31 Id.
32 id.
33 id.
34 THE PROTOCOLS, supra note 2, at 14.
35 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
361 Id. at 7-8, 12.
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The state should ensure that there are resource centers and properly selected
and performing counsel that deal with every phase of capital litigation, since it is
the state government that prosecutes and executes people.
An egregious example of a state that has utterly failed in this regard is
Alabama. By June 2001, thirty of Alabama's 188 death row inmates lacked
counsel.3 7 Since in many of these (and other) cases it is likely that no capable
counsel will be found during the year after their convictions and death sentences
become "final" (that is, after the Alabama Supreme Court denies direct appeal
and following the denial of certiorari, if applied for), any federal habeas corpus
petition that any of them later files-once counsel is found-may be held time-
barred. This could occur under a strict reading of the AEDPA, which creates a
one-year statute of limitations for filing federal habeas corpus claims once the
conviction has become "final. ''38
Although the one-year limitations period is tolled if the inmate has a pending
state post-conviction proceeding, the thirty Alabama death row inmates referred
to above found it impossible to file state post-conviction papers without the
assistance of counsel.39 As Bryan Stevenson, Executive Director of the Equal
Justice Initiative (which represents many Alabama death row inmates and
mentors attorneys for many others) has pointed out, a system which does not
guarantee that indigent death row inmates get counsel "puts prisoners in the
position of investigating new facts and presenting claims of legal error, which is a
little tough if you're on death row."40
It is therefore possible that many Alabama death row inmates lacking counsel
will be deemed to have waived all their constitutional claims, no matter how
meritorious. It is unacceptable, in the ABA's opinion, for state officials to claim
that there is no problem because some Alabama death row inmates have been
fortunate enough to get pro bono attorneys from large non-Alabama law firms
who have represented them effectively.4'
Under current circumstances, that is a non sequitur. Despite yeoman's efforts
by the Equal Justice Initiative, the ABA's Death Penalty Representation Project
and others, it has proven impossible to find pro bono lawyers for dozens of
Alabama's death row inmates. The state should feel obligated to ensure that
capable lawyers with proper resources and mentoring are found for these
inmates.42
37 David Firestone, Inmates on Alabama 's Death Row Lack Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, June
16, 2001, at A 11.
39 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
39 Firestone, supra note 37, at A 11.
40 Id.
41 Id. (statement of Attorney General Bill Pryor of Alabama that "[t]hey can get some of
the best lawyers in the country to represent them").
42 In December 2001, the Equal Justice Initiative filed a federal lawsuit seeking redress for
the complete lack of representation in many post-conviction cases, and for the severe limits on
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The fact that pro bono counsel have secured relief for many Alabama death
row inmates proves the opposite of what Alabama's "head in the sand"
government officials state. It shows that when an Alabama death row inmate does
get proper counsel for state post-conviction and federal habeas corpus
proceedings, it is very likely that the conviction or death sentence will be
reversed, due to serious constitutional violations. This means that, in the absence
of such counsel, time-barring or waiver of constitutional claims will certainly lead
to the execution of people who, if they did have appropriate counsel, would
receive a lesser sentence or would be completely exonerated.
C. Enabling Relief to be Granted When Federal Constitutional Rights
Have Been Violated
The protocols advocate that there be an automatic stay of execution during
the entire first round of litigation (including direct appeal, state post-conviction,
federal habeas corpus, and the ensuing certiorari petitions).43 And the protocols
state that post-conviction counsel should be accorded sufficient time to investigate
properly.44 Although states cannot change the federal statute of limitations, they
can change state time limits.
The protocols make a series of recommendations regarding a variety of limits
on the courts' ability to decide the merits of meritorious constitutional claims. The
ABA says that in deciding whether a constitutional claim has been waived, there
should be a knowing, understanding, and voluntary standard-both on direct
appeal and in the first round of post-conviction proceedings. Under this approach,
a constitutional claim would not be deemed waived when a court-appointed
lawyer negligently fails to object at the time called for by state law. Instead, in
order to waive a constitutional claim, a lawyer would have to know he is waiving
the claim, understand what he is waiving, and voluntarily waive it.
The protocols recommend that state courts give full retroactive effect to
United States Supreme Court decisions and consider decisions by federal appeals
and district courts.45 The state courts need not be limited by the same retroactivity
doctrines that restrict the federal courts. The unfair impact of these retroactivity
doctrines is apparent fiom what occurred to Virginia death row inmate Joseph
O'Dell. Mr. O'Dell's counsel objected, at trial and in every proceeding thereafter,
to the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that, if not sentenced to death, he
would never be eligible for parole.46 Counsel sought this instruction after the
client access and the $1,000 expense limits for those lawyers who represent Alabama's death
row inmates in post-conviction proceedings. See Death Row Inmates Sue State, BIRMINGHAM
ALABAMA NEws, Dec. 29, 2001, at Al.
43 THE PROTOCOLS, supra note 2, at 20.
44 id.
451 Id. at 21.
46 O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1997).
2002]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
prosecution introduced evidence that, after being paroled on earlier occasions, Mr.
O'Dell had committed crimes.4' The prosecution used this evidence to assert that
unless sentenced to death, Mr. O'Dell would be dangerous in the future.48 After
the trial judge refused to instruct the jury that Mr. O'Dell would never be eligible
for parole, it sentenced Mr. O'Dell to death, and stated that it had found future
dangerousness to be an aggravating circumstance. 49 Following Mr. O'Dell's
direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court and the denial of certiorari (i.e., after
his death sentence had become "final" for purposes of retroactivity analysis),50 the
United States Supreme Court upheld, in the case of a South Carolina death row
inmate, the very same constitutional claim that Mr. O'Dell had asserted at and
after trial.5" Thus, in Simmons v. South Carolina,52 the Supreme Court held that
the trial judge had committed constitutional error in not instructing the jury that
Mr. Simmons, if not sentenced to death, would never be eligible for parole.53
Following the Simmons holding, Mr. O'Dell continued to litigate his claim in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.54 But when his case reached the Supreme
Court, it denied him relief." Why? Because the Court's Simmons holding, three
years earlier, had come after Mr. O'Dell's death sentence had become "final.
' 56
Therefore, under the anti-retroactivity doctrine that the Supreme Court had
formulated, Simmons came too late to help Mr. O'Dell.
Accordingly, Mr. O'Dell was put to death by Virginia later in 1997, even
though it was indisputable in 1994-when Simmons was decided-that his death
sentence was unconstitutional. While the State of Virginia cannot change the
federal habeas corpus retroactivity doctrine, it can change its own system so that
someone in Mr. O'Dell's situation would be able to secure relief from the state
courts.
The protocols advocate that state courts allow a petitioner to get a ruling on
the merits of constitutional claims in second post-conviction proceedings if these
issues were not presented earlier due to counsel's errors, prosecutorial
misconduct, newly discovered facts that could not reasonably have been learned
earlier, or intervening court decisions.57
The states are not bound by the AEDPA's unfair provisions and the Supreme
Court's anti-retroactivity rulings that restrict federal court consideration of such
471d. at 154.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
" Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
52 id.
" Id. at 178.
14 O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 154-55 (1997).55 Id. at 167.
" Id. at 157, 160.
57 THE PROTOCOLS, supra note 2, at 21.
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claims. Under the AEDPA, even the most fundamental travesty of justice that
changes the outcome of the life versus death determination in the trial's penalty
phase cannot be considered in a successor habeas petition, even if there was no
basis for presenting the issue earlier, unless there is also such strong evidence of
innocence that virtually every reasonable person would agree that the wrong
person was convicted. Unlike the AEDPA's authors, state legislators should
recognize that a death sentence that is the product of a grossly distorted
sentencing proceeding should not be carried out.
D. Meaningful Consideration of Clemency
The protocols advocate that clemency authorities undertake an independent
consideration of all issues. Clemency authorities should not assume that the
merits of these issues have already been considered or that an error deemed
harmless in a constitutional analysis can have no bearing on clemency. As
discussed to some extent above, limitations imposed by the Supreme Court and
the AEDPA frequently preclude the granting of relief even where egregious
constitutional violations have occurred.59 But those limitations do not preclude
the granting of clemency. Thus, in the case of Joseph O'Dell, the Virginia
clemency authorities could have recognized the unfairness of executing a person
whose death sentence was clearly unconstitutional according to the Supreme
Court holding handed down after his direct appeal.
Clemency authorities should also consider racial and geographic
disproportionality in the imposition of capital punishment-even though the
unequal treatment of similar cases may not violate the Constitution. The problem
of inconsistencies in the handling of capital cases in different parts of the same
state has recently been the focus of numerous news reports and judicial'
comments.
For example, ABC News' Nightline reported on September 13, 2000, that
"sometimes what makes all the difference is whether a murder is committed on
one side of the street or the other."60 Thus, in Baltimore County, Maryland, which
has "a relatively low crime rate," one is far more likely, on similar facts, to have
the prosecution seek and secure the death penalty than in the City of Baltimore,
Maryland61 because the prosecutors in these two Maryland jurisdictions have
vastly different views on when seeking the death penalty is appropriate. Baltimore
County has "more inmates sitting on Maryland's death row than any other
jurisdiction in the state" because its state's attorney, Sandra O'Connor, takes the
5 d. at 24.
59 See supra Part HI. C.
60 Nightline, Crime and Punishment: A Matter of Life and Death Part 2 (ABC News
Television Broadcast Sept. 13, 2000) at http://abcnews.go.com/onair/
nightline/transcripts/nI 00913trans.html-size 54.4K.
61 id.
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view that if she can legally seek the death penalty, she will.62 In stark contrast, the
City of Baltimore's prosecutor, Patricia Jessamy, recognizes that under all capital
punishment statutes, the prosecutor has discretion as to whether or not to seek the
death penalty in death-eligible cases.63 She has "the philosophy that only the
defendants who commit the most heinous crimes are those defendants that we
should seek the death penalty on.
'
"64
E. The Necessity of Comprehensible Jury Instructions
Commissions or legislative committees should also analyze jury instructions,
determine which ones may be misunderstood, and advocate that confusing
instructions be revised. For example, many jurors mistakenly think that
"mitigating" is the same as "aggravating," and a tremendous number refuse to
believe that life without parole exists where it unequivocally does exist. There
should be clear instructions on these points. Moreover, the defense should be
permitted to show that, in reality, people serving life without parole do not get
pardons, clemency, parole, or anything else-even though such relief may
theoretically be possible.
F. Restoring and Enhancing Judicial Independence
Judges who adjudicate capital cases sometimes come under political attack as
a result of decisions in which they impose or uphold sentences less than death.
This threat to judicial independence can cause irreparable harm to judges, capital
defendants, and the entire justice system. The protocols recommend that the
organized bar educate the public about judges' responsibilities, and support
judges who are attacked for rulings in capital punishment cases where the attacks
unfairly focus not on the legal issues, but on the nature of the crimes.65 Although
every lawyer knows that you may have a valid constitutional claim even though
your crime was egregious, the public needs to be provided this basic information.
In addition, it should be considered unethical for any judicial candidate to promise
how he or she will deal with capital punishment cases.
G. Judicial Intervention to Deal with Ineffective Counsel or Prosecutorial
Misconduct
The protocols advocate that a judge should be proactive in the face of
ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.66A judge should
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 THE PROTOCOLS, supra note 2, at 33.
66 Id.
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remove defense counsel whose ineffectiveness is apparent, and should impose
meaningful sanctions against prosecutors who are more interested in "winning"
than in justice.
H. Acting to Minimize the Impact of Racial Discrimination
The protocols recommend that valid studies on racial discrimination in the
jurisdiction be reviewed for indicia of discrimination based on either the race of
the victim or the race of the defendant. 67 New analyses of racial discrimination
should consider all potentially capital cases-not just cases brought as first degree
murder cases. Statistically valid evidence of racial discrimination in administering
capital punishment-such as the many studies the GAO found valid in 199068_
should create a prima facie case of discrimination. The prosecution should have to
rebut this with persuasive evidence.
I. Juveniles and People with Mental Retardation
The ABA advocates abolishing the death penalty for juveniles and people
with mental retardation, and it submitted an amicus curiae brief in McCarver v.
North Carolina, a case in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
reconsider the constitutionality of executing people with mental retardation.69
North Carolina enacted a law in August 2001 barring the execution of people with
mental retardation, and made it retroactive to people already on death row. 70 That
led the Supreme Court in September 2001 to dismiss the certiorari granted in
McCarver7' and to grant certiorari in Atlans v. Virginia, which raises the same
constitutional issue.72 The ABA hopes that the Supreme Court will now hold
unconstitutional the execution of people with mental retardation.
The protocols go on to say that if executions of people with mental
retardation are not banned, a variety of steps to diminish unfairness should be
adopted.73
671d. at36.
68 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATrERN OF RACIAL DISPARrTIES (1990).
69 McCarver v. North Carolina, 548 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 2001), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 941
(U.S. Mar. 26, 2001) (No. 00-8727).
70 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 346.
" McCarver v. North Carolina, 548 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 2001), cert. dismissed, 122 S. Ct. 22
(U.S. Sept. 25, 2001) (No. 00-8727).
72 Atkins v. Virginia, 510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999), cert. granted 122 S. Ct. 24 (U.S. Sept.
25, 2001) (No. 00-8452).
73 THE PROTOCOLS, supra note 2, at 40.
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J. The Mentally Ill
The protocols also make recommendations concerning people with mental
illness. 4 The protocols suggest that appropriate, independent experts be
appointed, funded, and given adequate time to do a thorough evaluation of a
capital defendant who may be mentally ill. 75 There should no longer be cases in
which the only "expert" is someone whom the prosecution habitually uses, or in
which an "expert" gives an opinion on mental illness without ever meeting the
defendant, or after only one brief meeting.
The protocols urge that all participants in the legal system be trained about
the nature of various kinds of mental illness, including fetal alcohol disorder and
post-traumatic stress disorder.76 Many defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges
are not familiar with mental illness and its impacts. This ignorance may lead to
miscarriages of justice. Moreover, jurors must not only be presented with truly
expert opinions on mental illness; they should also be instructed that mental
illness should be considered only as a mitigating factor, not as an aggravating
factor.
IV. CONCLUSION
The protocols should be used in evaluating state death penalty systems
seriously and methodically. Until such studies are concluded and the public can
consider their import, there should be a moratorium on all executions.
74 1d. at 44.
75 1d. at45.761d. at44.
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